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The menu-cost interpretation of sticky prices implies that the probability of a price change should
depend on the past history of prices and fundamentals only through the gap between the current
price and the frictionless price. We find that this prediction is broadly consistent with the behavior
of 9 Philadelphia gasoline wholesalers. We nevertheless reject the menu-cost model as a literal
description of these firms’ behavior, arguing instead that price stickiness arises from strategic
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The failure of prices to adjust immediately to changes in fundamentals is 
central to many of the key issues in economics.  Why don’t prices change every day?  
This paper investigates 9 individual gasoline wholesalers, and tries to predict on 
which days a given firm will change its price.  We use the regularities uncovered to 
draw conclusions about the forces that may prevent prices from changing. 
Our starting point is Dixit’s (1991) model of price determination with a fixed 
cost of changing prices.  According to this framework, the past history of the firm’s 
prices and fundamentals should help predict a price change only through the current 
gap between price and fundamentals.  The model further implies a particular 
functional form, and allows interpretation of the coefficients in terms of parameters 
of the optimization problem facing the firm.  We compare these predictions with 
those from more flexible, atheoretical forecasting models. 
We find that in many respects the Dixit framework serves quite well.  The 
gap between price and fundamentals indeed appears to be the most important factor 
influencing the probability of a price change, and the Dixit functional form seems 
reasonably appropriate as well.  We do find statistically significant departures from 
the predictions of the model for almost all the firms we study, though there is 
surprising heterogeneity across firms in the form that this departure takes.  The most 
common finding contrary to the model’s predictions is an asymmetric response to 
positive and negative price gaps.  If the gap between the target and actual price is 
small in absolute value, a typical firm is more likely to raise its price when the                                                                                                                                                     3
 
 
current price is a little below its target than it is to lower the price when it is an 
equivalent amount above the target.  On the other hand, if the gap between target and 
actual price has become large in absolute value, firms are quicker to change the price 
when their price is too high compared to when it is too low. 
Another implication of the Dixit model that appears to be inconsistent with 
our data is the structural interpretation of the estimated coefficients.  In order to fit 
the observed infrequency of price changes, one would need to assume that both the 
firm’s uncertainty about future fundamentals, and the amount by which it changes 
the price when it does change, are quite large.  Both parameters can be inferred 
directly using data other than the frequency of price adjustment, and these inferred 
values are an order of magnitude smaller than the structural estimates. 
We conclude that although a cost of changing prices is likely an important 
factor in accounting for sticky prices, a typical firm’s calculation is not accurately 
described as a tradeoff between an administrative cost of changing price and loss of 
current profits, as presumed in the Dixit framework.  Instead, the cost of changing 
prices seems more likely to be due to how the firm expects its customers and 
competitors to react to any price changes. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews previous literature.  
Section 3 develops the models we will use to try to predict whether the price changes 
on any given day.  The data used in this study are described in Section 4.  Section 5 
reports empirical results for the menu-cost model. Section 6 reports results for the 




2. Previous literature. 
The phrase “sticky prices” has been interpreted to mean different things by 
different researchers.  One branch of the literature has used the expression to refer to 
a gradual distributed lag relating prices to changes in fundamentals, such as the 
lagged response of retail to wholesale prices or wholesale to bulk prices for 
individual commodities (Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert 1997; Borenstein and 
Shepard, 2002; Levy, Dutta, and Bergen, 2002), or the gradual response of aggregate 
wages and prices to macroeconomic developments (Sims, 1998).  Theoretical 
explanations of such sluggishness include the suggestion that customers are less 
alienated by a string of small price changes than a single large change (Rotemberg, 
1982), physical barriers to rapid adjustment of production or inventories (Borenstein 
and Shepard, 2002), and gradual processing of information (Sims, 1998). 
By contrast, the focus of the present paper is on the discreteness of the price 
adjustment process-- fundamentals change continuously whereas prices change only 
occasionally.   There are three main explanations for this form of price stickiness. 
One interpretation is based on the administrative expenses associated with changing 
a posted price, such as the cost of printing new catalogs. The quintessential example 
is the cost a restaurant must pay in order to print a new menu, and for this reason this 
class of models is often described as “menu-cost models.”  In these models, in 
response to a change in fundamentals, the firm either makes no change in the price or 
else adjusts completely to the new optimum.  Theoretical treatments of such pricing                                                                                                                                                     5
 
 
behavior were provided by Barro (1972), Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983), 
Benabou (1988), Dixit (1991), Tsiddon (1993), Chalkley (1997), Aguirregabriria 
(1999), Danzinger (1999), Hansen (1999), and Bennett and LaManna (2001), among 
others.
1 
Although such costs are presumably quite small, they could nevertheless 
exert a significant economic influence (Mankiw, 1985; Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 
1987).  Levy, et. al. (1997) sought to measure directly the costs of changing prices 
for five supermarket chains, and found these to be 0.70 percent of revenues.  They 
found that the supermarket chain with higher menu costs changed prices much less 
frequently than the others.  Dutta, et. al. (1999) similarly estimated the costs to be 
0.59 percent for drugstore chains.  However, more detailed microeconomic evidence 
is difficult to reconcile with the menu-cost explanation.  Direct surveys suggest that 
managers do not take these costs into account in pricing decisions (Blinder, et. al., 
1998, and Hall, Walsh, and Yates, 2000).  Carlton (1986) studied industrial prices 
and Kashyap (1995) investigated catalog prices.  Both noted that when firms change 
prices, they often do so in very small increments, behavior inconsistent with the 
simple menu-cost interpretation.  Other studies that reach a similar conclusion 
include Cecchetti’s (1986) analysis of magazine prices, Benabou’s (1992) 
investigation of retail markups, Lach and Tsiddon’s (1993) and Eden’s (2001) study 
of Israeli supermarket prices, and Carlson’s (1992) survey of price changes.  
Supermarket scanner data further reveal a tendency of the price to return to its earlier                                                                                                                                                     6
 
 
value after a sale (Levy, Dutta, and Bergen, 2002; Rotemberg, 2002), a form of 
stickiness that could not be explained in terms of the cost of posting a new price. 
A second explanation for the discreteness of price adjustment posits the 
discrete arrival of market information.  Calvo (1983) proposed that firms are subject 
to random shocks that “prevent them to observe and verify changes in the ‘state of 
nature’ that would otherwise lead to price changes” (p. 384).  Eden (1990, 2001) 
suggested that price stickiness arises from the fact that firms must precommit to 
capacity constraints before knowing the realization of the money supply.  Mankiw 
and Reis (2002) proposed that each period, only a fraction of wage setters receive 
new information about the economy and are able to adjust their plans accordingly.  If 
acquisition of information requires a fixed expenditure of resources, such 
information-based stories could be fit into the menu-cost framework in which the 
cost associated with changing the price is not a physical cost of posting a new price 
but rather a personnel or management cost in determining a new value for the price.  
Calvo-type models have recently become popular explanations for observed 
aggregate price dynamics; see for example Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone 
(2002), or, for a dissenting viewpoint, Bils and Klenow (2002). 
A third explanation for price stickiness is the feared response by customers or 
competitors if the firm changed its price.   Stiglitz (1984) discussed asymmetric 
customer responses with costly search, limit pricing and entry deterrence, and 
coordinating collusive behavior as possible explanations, whereas Rotemberg (2002) 
suggested that consumers punish sellers whose prices they deem to be “unfair.”                                                                                                                                                     7
 
 
The goal of this paper is to fit an explicit optimizing menu-cost model of 
price dynamics developed by Dixit (1991) and Hansen (1998) to observed data.    
This generalizes the Sheshinski and Weiss menu-cost model employed in Dahlby’s 
(1992) analysis of Canadian automobile insurance premiums in a very critical 
direction, allowing the frictionless optimal price to be stochastic rather than 
deterministic.  We investigate whether this model can account for the dynamic 
adjustment of individual wholesale gasoline prices to changes in bulk spot prices.  
By further comparing this structural model with atheoretical summaries of pricing 
dynamics, we hope to shed light on which of the three explanations (menu costs, 
information processing, or market responses) best fits the observed facts. 
 
3. Models of pricing dynamics. 
  a. The Dixit menu-cost model.  
Let p(t) denote the log of the price charged by the firm and  ) (
* t p the log of 
the target price, where time is regarded as continuous.  The firm chooses dates t1, 
t2,… at which to change price so as to minimize 
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for W(t) standard Brownian motion.  Here g is a lump-sum cost of changing the price 
of the good, the scalar k controls the cost of deviating from the target price, and σ  is                                                                                                                                                     8
 
 
the standard deviation of the change in the target price.  Dixit (1991) and Hansen 
(1999) showed that the solution is to change the price to ) ( ) (
*
i i t p t p =  at any date ti 
for which  b t p t p i i = − − | ) ( ) ( |
*
1 , with the optimal maximal deviation b given by 
(3.1)   .
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  Suppose that the firm is following this policy, and is charging a price p(t) at 
date t.  One can approximate the probability that the price changes between dates t 
and t + 1 by the probability that  b t p t p > + − | ) 1 ( ) ( |
* .  Note that for the upper bound, 
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for Z ~ N(0,1) and Φ (.) the cumulative distribution function for a standard Normal 
variable.  Reasoning analogously for the lower bound, the probability of a change in 
the price between t and t + 1 can be approximated by  
(3.3)  .
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For observed discrete-time data, let xt = 1 if the price changes on day t and zero 
otherwise.  The log of the likelihood of observing the sample {x1, x2,… xT} is then 
given by
2                                                                                                                                                     9
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b. Atheoretical logit specification. 
  The second model we investigate is an atheoretical specification in which the 
probability of a price change at t + 1 depends on a vector of variables zt observed at 
time t, which includes  , t p  
*
t p , and their lagged values.  We assume that zt helps to 
forecast the probability of a price change based on a logistic functional form, 
(3.5) )] ' exp( 1 /[ ) ' exp( 1 γ z γ z t t t h + = +  
where ! is a vector of parameters, to be estimated by maximizing the likelihood 
(3.6)  {} . ) 1 log( ) 1 ( log
1
0
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t
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c. The Autoregressive Conditional Hazard model. 
Our third approach attempts to model the serial correlation properties of the 
observed sequence {xt} using an approach proposed by Hamilton and Jorda (2002).  
Their starting point was the Autoregressive Conditional Duration model developed 
by Engle and Russell (1998).  Let un denote the number of days between the nth and 
the (n + 1)th time that a firm is observed  to change its price, and let !n denote the 
expectation of un given past observations un-1, un-2, ..., u1.  The ACD(1,1) model 
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for u the average length of time observed between price changes.  In the exponential 
ACD specification, if the expected length of time until the next price change is !n = 3                                                                                                                                                     10
 
 
days, the probability of a price change tomorrow is 1/3.  More generally, if n(t) 
denotes the number of times the firm has been observed to change its price as of day 
t, the probability of a change on day t + 1 would be 
(3.8) . / 1 ) ( 1 t n t h ψ = +   
The forecast probability of a change is thus the reciprocal of a weighted average of 
recent durations between changes.  Hamilton and Jorda proposed a generalization of 
the exponential ACD specification in which expected duration depends linearly on 
other variables observed at t in addition to lagged durations, replacing (3.8) with 
(3.9) ]. ' /[ 1 ) ( 1 t t n t h z γ + = + ψ   
Again the log likelihood is obtained by using this expression for ht+1 in (3.6), which 
is maximized with respect to ", #, and !. 
  A probability must fall between zero and unity.  To ensure this condition, we 
replace the denominator of (3.9) with the larger of  ] ' [ ) ( t t n z γ + ψ  and 1.0001, and 
employ a differentiable smooth pasting function for the transition for values between 
1.0001 and 1.1, as detailed in Hamilton and Jorda (2002).    
 
4. Data. 
Refined gasoline is transported by pipeline from New York to Philadelphia, 
where it is stored and resold in smaller wholesale lots either directly to individual 
retail gasoline stations or to independent “jobbers” who in turn may resell it to the 
retailers. We purchased daily prices for all of the wholesalers of Philadelphia 
gasoline for 1989 to 1991 from Oil Pricing Information Services                                                                                                                                                     11
 
 
(http://www.opisnet.com/).  Although we have Saturday observations for part of the 
sample, for consistency we use only Monday through Friday data throughout the 
analysis, treating the Friday to Monday change the same as that between any two 
consecutive days.  Apart from weekends, for five of the firms we have no missing 
observations over the three-year period.  Firm 4 and Firm 6 are missing observations 
at the end of the sample, and Firm 9 is missing observations at both the beginning 
and the end of the sample.  Firm 7 is missing 3 observations in the middle, which we 
treated by artificially setting ht+1 = 1 for the day following this gap, in effect 
dummying out its influence.  Several other Philadelphia wholesalers had more 
extensive missing observations and were not used in the analysis. 
We base our target price series 
*
t p  on the cash price of unleaded gasoline 
delivered to the New York Harbor, as quoted by the New York Mercantile Ex-
change.  These data were obtained from Datastream (http://www.datastream.com/).  
We assume that each wholesaler’s target price 
*
t p  is a constant mark-up over the 
NYMEX price, where we estimate this desired mark-up for each firm from the 
average value of 
*
t t p p − over the sample.  The wholesalers set their price to go into 
effect at midnight.  Hence pt+1 should respond to 
*
t p  but not to  .
*
1 + t p  
The data for the 9 firms used are summarized in Table 1.  The average mark-
ups range from 2 to 4 cents per gallon.  The NYMEX price of gasoline changes 
almost every day, whereas these wholesalers typically change their price every two 
or three days.  This is the essential friction that we seek to explain.                                                                                                                                                       12
 
 
The Dixit model assumes that 
*
t p  follows a random walk, which appears to 
be an excellent description of these data.  For example, OLS estimation of an AR(2) 
model for first differences of 
*
t p for firm 1 results in(standard errors in parentheses) 
.
) 036 . 0 (
018 . 0
) 036 . 0 (
057 . 0
) 103 . 0 (






1 t t t t e p p p + ∆ − ∆ + = ∆ − −  
All three coefficients are individually statistically insignificant, and a test of the joint 
null hypothesis that all three are zero is accepted with a p-value of 0.44.  We also 
regressed  *
t p ∆  on 12 monthly dummies, accepting the null hypothesis of no 
seasonality with a p-value of 0.43.  All of these results are fully consistent with the 
Dixit assumption that 
*
t p  follows a random walk. 
 
5. Results for the menu-cost model. 
  Our first step was to use the menu-cost model to predict the days on which 
each firm would change its price.  Let  t NY P , denote the bulk price (in cents/gallon) in 
New York, it P the price charged by wholesaler i in Philadelphia, $it = log(Pit/PNY,t) the 
percentage gap, and  it
T
t i T δ δ 1
1
=
− Σ = the average percentage mark-up for firm i.  We 
replaced 
*
t t p p − in expression (3.3) with  i it δ δ −  and then chose b and % so as to 
maximize (3.4) for each firm.  These maximum likelihood estimates of b and % and 
reported in the first two columns of Table 2.   
  As a first check on the reasonableness of these estimates, we calculate the 
implied value of g, the cost imputed to the firm each time it changes the price,                                                                                                                                                     13
 
 
relative to k, the parameter governing the curvature of its profit function.  Note from 







k g =  
estimated values of which are reported in the third column of Table 2.  To interpret 
these values, consider a monopolistic firm facing demand curve  1 , > =
− γ
γ
t t t P A Q  
and total cost CtQt, for Qt the level of output, Pt the level of prices, and Ct the 
constant marginal cost.  Profits are given by 
   .
1 γ γ − − − = Π t t t t t t P A C P A  
In the absence of menu costs, profit maximization calls for setting 
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for kt = (γ /2)QtCt.  Maximizing profit is thus approximately equivalent to minimizing 
2 *) ( t t t p p k − .  Hence the estimate of g/k can be interpreted as the ratio of the cost of 
changing prices (g) relative to one-half of total costs times the elasticity of demand 
((γ /2)QtCt).  For example, with a demand elasticity of & = 2, the estimate g/k can be 
interpreted as menu costs as a fraction of total costs.  The fact that the values of g/k 
found in Table 2 are typically well below 1% is thus a very encouraging indicator of 
the plausibility of these estimates. 
  Two alternative checks of the menu-cost model are more troubling.  The 
estimate of % in the second column of Table 2 is based solely on the frequency with 
which firm i changes prices, that is, solely on the probability that xt+1 = 1 given 
*
t t p p − .  (We will suppress the i subscript for clarity in this discussion). In the 
structural model from which (3.3) was derived, the parameter % corresponds to the 
standard deviation of daily changes in 
*
t p .  Under our assumptions, this magnitude 
can also be inferred directly from the standard deviation of log (PNY,t/PNY,t-1), which 
is reported in the fourth column of Table 2.  This direct estimate is typically smaller 
than the MLE estimate in column 2 by a factor of 5.  In other words, firms are acting 
as if they have much more uncertainty about where the future fundamentals are 
headed than is warranted given the observed behavior of the New York price.                                                                                                                                                     15
 
 
  If our proxy for the firm’s target price 
^
*
t p differs from the true target price 
*




t t t u p p + = , this might account for an overly large 
estimated value for %(MLE).  However, one would expect measurement error to also 




t p .  The puzzle is not simply the large value for %(MLE), but further 
the difference between %(MLE) and %(direct). 
  A separate issue on the plausibility of the parameter estimates is the 
estimated value of b.  According to the model, in continuous time whenever the firm 
changed the price, it should do so by exactly b.  For a typical firm, this corresponds 
to a 10-15% change in prices.  We report in column 5 of Table 2 a direct estimate of 
b based on the median absolute value of the logarithmic change in price for those 
days when the firm did change its price.  This is an order of magnitude smaller than 
the MLE in the first column for almost all firms. 
  To summarize, the parameter estimates imply a ratio of b
2 to %
 that is 
reasonable given a menu-cost interpretation of pricing, but the level of b is much 
larger than can be reconciled with the observed magnitude of price changes, and the 
level of %
 is much larger than can be reconciled with the difficulty in forecasting the 
the price of bulk gasoline in New York Harbor.  The basic mechanism that accounts 
for sticky prices in the Dixit model is that the firm tolerates a spread between pt and 
*
t p  in the anticipation that future changes in 
*
t p  may make a change in pt 
unnecessary.  That such a trade-off accounts for the firm’s decision not to change its                                                                                                                                                     16
 
 
price is difficult to reconcile with the rational level of uncertainty about 
*
t p  and the 
magnitude of the price change that the firm will ultimately end up making. 
  Our results thus reinforce Borenstein and Shepard’s (2002) conclusion that 
menu costs can not account for the sluggish behavior of wholesale gasoline prices.  
They base their conclusion on distributed lag regressions involving spot and futures 
prices.  We study here a different kind of sluggishness, the fact that particular spot 
prices remain frozen for several days, but reach the same overall conclusion.   
 
6. Comparison with other models. 
  In this section we explore a variety of alternatives to the Dixit menu-cost 
model.  Let capital letters denote levels rather than logs, so that  t NY it it P P , − = ∆  is 
the difference in price between Philadelphia and New York in cents per gallon, 
it
T
t i T ∆ Σ = ∆ =
−
1
1  is the average mark-up reported in column 2 of Table 1, and 
| | | | *
i it it it P P ∆ − ∆ = −  is the absolute  value of the deviation of the firm’s current 
price from the target. 
  A logit framework affords a flexible class of models for characterizing the 
dynamics of price changes.  We first consider a model in which the probability of a 
price change depends on the same variables as in the menu-cost model, 
(6.1) , |)' | , 1 ( *
it it it P P − = z  
but with a logistic functional form for the probability (expressions (3.5) and (3.6)) 
rather than the menu-cost functional form ((3.3) and (3.4)).  The value of the log                                                                                                                                                     17
 
 
likelihood achieved with the logistic functional form is compared with that for the 
menu-cost specification in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.  The menu-cost specification 
does better for 3 of the firms and the logit specification does better for the other 6, 
though the values of the log likelihood are quite close in most cases.  Since the 
logistic functional form does as good or better job of describing the data, it offers a 
convenient framework for investigating the role of additional explanatory variables 
besides | |
*
it it P P −  as factors that may influence the decision to change prices. 
We first investigate the Calvo possibility that information processing delays 
rather than a physical cost of posting new prices could account for the stickiness of 
prices by testing for delays in the response of firms to available information.  
According to the menu-cost model, only the current day’s gap  | |
*
it it P P −  should 
predict a price change on day t + 1.  If there are delays in a firm’s ability to process 
information, the previous day’s gap  | |
*
1 , 1 , − − − t i t i P P  may contain additional predictive 
power.  Column 1 of Table 4 reports the p-value for a likelihood test of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on  | |
*
1 , 1 , − − − t i t i P P  is zero, when this is added as a third 
explanatory variable to (6.1).  This test finds evidence of information delays for only 
2 of the 9 firms. 
  Next, we look for evidence of the Rotemberg (1982) suggestion that the firm 
deliberately stretches out price changes so as to keep from upsetting customers, as in 
the quadratic adjustment cost model.  Let w1i(t) denote the date of firm i’s most 
recent price change as of date t.  Thus, if the firm changed the price on day t, then 
w1i(t) = t.  If the firm changed the price on day t - 2 and left it at that level on days t -                                                                                                                                                     18
 
 
1 and t, then w1i(t) = t - 2.  If the firm only partially adjusted the price on date w1i(t), 
intending to make additional changes shortly, then the size of the gap remaining after 
the previous correction  | |
*
) ( 1 , ) ( 1 , t w i t w i i i P P −  should help to predict a price change over 
and above the value of the current gap  | |
*
, , t i t i P P − .  Column 2 of Table 4 finds no 
evidence of gradual price adjustment for any of the firms. Taking the results of 
columns 1 and 2 together, we conclude that for most firms, the hypothesis that the 
probability of a price change depends on the past only through the value of 
| |
*
, , t i t i P P −  appears to be consistent with observed pricing behavior, so that this 
qualitative prediction of the menu-cost story is consistent with the data. 
  A more telling way to distinguish the menu-cost and information hypotheses 
from a response to market concerns is to look for evidence of possible asymmetry.  It 
is commonly believed that firms are willing to increase their prices in response to a 
rise in costs, but either are slow to react or do not adjust fully to a drop in costs.  
Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997), Peltzman (2000), and Ball and Mankiw 
(1994) suggested some reasons why we might find asymmetries in prices.  For the 
gasoline market in particular, Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) used an 
error-correction model to estimate cumulative adjustment functions using monthly 
data.  They found asymmetry in the price responses of spot gasoline to crude oil and 
retail gasoline to wholesale, though not in the link we investigate, wholesale gasoline 
to spot.  Balke, Brown and Yucel (1998) reported more mixed evidence of 
asymmetry with weekly data depending on how one estimates the cumulative 
adjustment functions.  Karrenbrock (1991) concluded that retail gasoline firms raise                                                                                                                                                     19
 
 
prices within a month of cost increases but take up to two months to lower them.  
Godby, et. al. (2000) found little evidence of asymmetry in the response of weekly 
Canadian retail gasoline prices to crude oil prices. 
  We revisit this asymmetry question using our daily data, exploring the effect 
of the sign of the price gap on the probability of a price change on any given day. Let 
’it be a dummy variable taking on the value of unity if  0
*
, , ≥ − t i t i P P  and zero 
otherwise.  A logit model with asymmetric effects could be estimated by letting 
(6.2)  )]' )( 1 ( ), 1 ( ), ( , [
*
1 , 1 ,
*
1 , 1 , − − − − − − − − − = t i t i it it t i t i it it it P P P P θ θ θ θ z  
and comparing (6.2) with (6.1) (which it nests) by a likelihood ratio test.  This test is 
reported in the final column of Table 4.  Here the evidence of a deviation from the 
menu-cost model is more widespread.  For 4 of the 9 firms, we would reject at the 
5% level the null hypothesis of symmetry with respect to price increases and 
decreases, and nearly reject for one other. 
  Table 5 reports parameter estimates for the asymmetric logit model based on 
(6.2).   For all but two of the firms, the coefficient on (1 - ’it) is larger than the 
coefficient on ’it, which means that the firm is more likely to raise the price when 
ε − = −
*
it it P P  than it is to lower the price when  ε = −
*
it it P P  for ( a small positive 
number.  A second source of asymmetry is that, for every firm, the coefficient on 
) (
*
it it it P P − θ is bigger than the coefficient on  ) )( 1 (
*
it it it P P − − − θ .  This means that 
the firm is less likely to raise the price when  ε − = −
*
it it P P  than it is to lower the 
price when  ε = −
*
it it P P  for ( a large positive number.  Figure 1 gives a visual                                                                                                                                                     20
 
 
representation of this asymmetry, plotting the value of (3.5) for zit given by (6.2) as a 
function of 
*
it it P P −  for each of the 9 firms.  The graphs indicate the probability that 
the firm would change its price on day t + 1 as the gap between  t P  and 
*
t P  varies 
from -20 to +20 cents per gallon.  
  Such a pattern of asymmetry seems much more likely to be due to concerns 
about the responses of customers or competitors to price changes than to 
administrative costs of changing prices.  For example, being the first firm to make a 
big price increase may be costly in terms of customer trust and loyalty, leading firms 
to postpone such a move even if it means selling at a loss for a short while.  By 
contrast, being the first with a small price increase may be much less important for 
customer loyalty. 
  The conclusion that concerns about the response of customers or competitors 
to price changes is the central explanation for price stickiness is also consistent with 
Borenstein and Shepard’s (2002) observation that wholesale gasoline prices adjust 
most gradually to changes in costs in the less competitive markets, and is also 
consistent with the explanations for price stickiness that emerge from the direct 
surveys of Blinder, et. al. (1998) and Hall, Walsh and Yates (2000).
 3  
  Finally, we look for evidence of general serial dependence in the timing of 
price changes using the ACH model.
4  We first fit an ACH model that ignores all 
information other than the recent frequency of price changes, choosing " and # so as 
to maximize the likelihood given by (3.6)-(3.8).  This was successful for firms 1, 5, 
and 6.  For the remaining firms, we had difficulty obtaining convergence of the ACH                                                                                                                                                     21
 
 
specification without a constant term (zt = 0).  To keep within a two-parameter 
family, for these firms we estimated an ACH(1,0) model (# = 0) and included a 
constant term (zt = 1).  For firm 3, the estimated " parameter was negative, indicating 
negative serial correlation; if this firm changed its price quickly on the previous 
interval, it is more likely to be a little slower next time.   Column 3 of Table 3 reports 
the value for the log likelihood achieved by a two-parameter ACH model for each of 
the firms.  The pure time-series model offers an improvement over the menu-cost 
specification for only one firm, and does substantially worse for most.  We interpret 
this as further support for the claim that the history of prices matters for the 
probability of a price change only through the current value of the price gap. 
  We next explored a nested model in which both the price gap and time-series 
terms enter, by estimating an ACH model of the form of (3.9) with zt given by (6.1), 
and investigated whether the price gap captures all the dynamics by testing the 
hypothesis " = # = 0.  The p-value for this hypothesis test is reported in the first 
column of Table 6.  We find a statistically significant contribution at the 5% level of 
lagged durations in two of the firms, and a nearly statistically significant contribution 
in two others.  
  To see whether our conclusions from Table 4 were proxying for some general 
features of omitted serial correlation, we repeat those hypothesis tests in a base 
model that includes nonzero " and # as well as the vector of variables zt as in (6.1).  
The conclusions in Table 6 are very similar to those in Table 4.  We continue to find 
some evidence of information delays for firms 1 and 3 but no evidence of partial                                                                                                                                                     22
 
 
adjustment for any of the firms. The evidence of asymmetry (column 4 of Table 6) is 
also very similar across firms as was found in Table 4, and the pattern of asymmetry 
(Table 7) is very similar to what we found for the logit specification in Table 5.  
Note that while  t z γ' appears in the numerator of (3.5), it is in the denominator of 
(3.9), causing coefficients to switch signs. Figure 2 plots the probabilities of a price 
change as a function of the price gap implied by the ACH estimates in Table 7.  In 
the ACH model, the probability of a price change is also influenced by the past 
history of price changes.  To construct Figure 2, we set !it equal to its average value 
for firm i.  The overall patterns in Figure 2 are quite similar to those we found from 
the asymmetric logit specification in Figure 1. 
  As a final way to compare the various models explored, we look at the 
Bayesian criterion suggested by Schwarz (1978).  This measure penalizes the log 
likelihood by subtracting (r/2) times the log of the number of observations, where r 
is the number of parameters used by the model.  The SBC is reported in the final 
columns of Tables 2, 5, and 7.  This criterion penalizes additional parameters more 
heavily than the hypothesis tests relied on earlier, so that, despite the statistical 
significance of the various departures from the menu-cost framework documented 
above, the SBC would end up selecting one of the two-parameter models of Table 3 
over any of the specifications in Tables 5 or 7.  The menu-cost model was always 
close to having the best performance of any of the two-parameter models.  
Particularly impressive is the fact that for two of the firms (firm 1 and firm 9), the                                                                                                                                                     23
 
 




  The menu-cost interpretation of price stickiness implies that the past history 
of the firm’s prices and fundamentals should help predict a price change only 
through the current gap between price and fundamentals.  This appears to be a 
reasonable parsimonious summary of the pricing behavior observed for most of the 9 
gasoline wholesalers we studied.  Although we can find other variables that also help 
predict price changes, the price gap appears to be the most important magnitude.  In 
this respect, we might liken the hypothesis to Samuelson’s (1965) and Fama’s (1970) 
suggestion that stock prices follow a random walk; although not literally true, it 
seems to be a good approximation.   
We found surprising heterogeneity across firms in the way that their pricing 
behavior seems to deviate from the menu-cost model.  Some firms seem to 
experience a delay in processing information. For most firms, we found some 
evidence of asymmetry.  For big changes, firms are more reluctant to increase prices 
than to lower them.  For small changes, by contrast, firms are more reluctant to lower 
prices than to raise them. 
Even ignoring these possible departures from menu-cost behavior, it is 
difficult to accept the menu-cost model as a literal description of firms’ pricing 
behavior.  Although the size of the estimated menu costs are of a reasonable                                                                                                                                                     24
 
 
magnitude, the model imputes to firms much more uncertainty about fundamentals 
than is warranted by the data, and would call for much larger price changes than 
firms actually make.   
Our overall conclusion is that firms’ decision to change prices is based on the 
trade-off between the benefits of having an optimal price and some sort of cost 
associated with changing the price itself.  However, the evidence suggests that this 
cost is not an administrative cost that is associated with a price change per se, nor a 
failure to obtain adequate information.  Instead it seems to reflect strategic 
considerations of how customers and competitors will react to a particular change.   
                                                           
1 Other models allowing both a fixed cost of changing prices (implying discreteness) and a convex 
penalty (implying gradual responses) include Konieczny (1993) and Slade (1998, 1999).  
2 Equation (3.4) is more general than the model actually estimated, which depends on  t p  and  *
t p  
only through the difference  ). * ( t p t p −   This is important because whereas  t p  and  *
t p  are each 
I(1), the difference  ) * ( t p t p −  is I(0).  The reader will note that in all the estimations below, the 
arguments of h(.) are always such I(0) transformations, thus avoiding some of the econometric issues 
raised by Park and Phillips (2000). 
3 Other papers investigating strategic considerations in the timing of gasoline price changes include 
Henly, Potter, and Town (1996) and Noel (2002a,b). 
4 Engle and Russell (1997) have an application of the related Autoregressive Conditional Duration 
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Table 1 
Summary of Data 
    






1  782 4.25 0.35 
     
2  782 2.12 0.46 
     
3  782 1.81 0.57 
     
4  641 2.82 0.37 
     
5  782 2.78 0.48 
     
6  743 3.74 0.41 
     
7  779 3.40 0.45 
     
8  782 3.71 0.45 
     
9  681 3.25 0.40 
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Table 2   
Menu Cost Model Estimation   
      
Firm  b (MLE)  ! (MLE)  g/k  ! (direct) b (direct) log L  Obs  Vars SBC 
1  0.153** 0.141*  * 0.0046 0.029 0.0090  -486.96  782 2  -493.62
  (0.015)  (0.017)             
2  0.138** 0.176**  0.0020 0.029 0.0076  -536.13  782 2  -542.79
  (0.028)  (0.039)           
3  0.055** 0.088** 0.00020  0.029 0.0116  -527.26  782 2  -533.93
  (0.009)  (0.015)           
4  0.154** 0.152**   0.0041 0.029 0.0104  -412.40  641 2  -418.86
  (0.020)  (0.023)           
5  0.128** 0.168**   0.0016 0.029 0.0090  -535.89  782 2  -542.55
  (0.021)  (0.031)           
6  0.105**    0.103**   0.0019 0.029 0.0076  -477.80  743 2  -484.41
  (0.008)  (0.010)           
7  0.130** 0.153**  0.0020 0.029 0.0081  -524.65  779 2  -531.31
  (0.016)  (0.022)             
8  0.119** 0.140**   0.0017 0.029 0.0075  -528.70  782 2  -535.37
  (0.015)  (0.021)           
9  0.120**    0.117**   0.0025 0.029 0.0078  -436.14  681 2  -442.66
  (0.010)  (0.012)           
 
Asymptotic standard errors (based on second derivatives of log likelihood) are in 
parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.  Double-asterisk 
(**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% level.    32 
 
Table 3 
Log Likelihood for Alternative Models 
    
Firm Menu  cost  Logit  ACH 
1  -486.96* -487.43  -505.37 
      
2  -536.13 -533.82*  -539.74 
      
3  -527.26 -524.05*  -533.35 
      
4  -412.40 -411.72*  -421.57 
      
5  -535.89 -537.15  -532.61*
      
6  -477.80 -476.32*  -501.38 
      
7  -524.65 -524.17*  -534.88 
      
8  -528.70 -527.44*  -537.73 
      
9  -436.14* -437.65  -455.39 
      
 
Asterisk (*) denotes best model by Schwarz condition.    33 
 
Table 4 
Tests for Significance of Additional Variables in Logit Specification 
  
Firm  |Pt-1  - P*t-1| |Pw1(t)  - P*w1(t)|  {"t, Pt  - P*t} 
1  0.006** 0.283  0.035* 
      
2  0.083 0.485  0.000** 
      
3  0.000** 0.294  0.265 
      
4  0.280 0.488  0.000** 
      
5  0.354 0.753  0.511 
      
6  0.237 0.642  0.000** 
      
7  0.842 0.642  0.235 
      
8  0.147 0.573  0.188 
      
9  0.963 0.417  0.056 
      
 
Table reports p-value of test of null hypothesis that the indicated variable does not belong 
as an additional explanatory variable to the logit model in Table 2.  Asterisk (*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically 
significant at the 1% level.    34 
 
Table 5 
Asymmetric Logit Estimates 
      
Firm  Pos const  Pos gap  Neg const Neg gap log L  Obs Vars  SBC 
1  -1.2338** 0.1507** -0.9253** 0.0604**  -484.08 782  4 -497.40
 (0.1526)  (0.0295)  (0.1568)  (0.0211)     
2 -0.6251**  0.1633** -0.1906 0.00058  -526.09 782  4  -539.41
 ( 0.1431) (0.0358) (0.1502) (0.0282)     
3 -0.0242  0.1967*  -0.0356  0.1119*  -522.72 782  4  -536.05
 (0.1074)  (0.0511)  (0.1491)  (0.0489)     
4  -1.3315** 0.1961** -0.5600**  0.0228  -402.74 641  4 -415.66
 (0.1731)  (0.0363)  (0.1692)  (0.0227)     
5 -0.3701**  0.0824** -0.1807  0.0379  -536.48 782  4  -549.80
 (0.1394)  (0.0312)  (0.1455)  (0.0236)     
6  -1.4714** 0.2658** -0.5068** 0.0704**  -466.48 743  4 -479.70
 (0.1793)  (0.0414)  (0.1590)  (0.0258)     
7  -0.5209** 0.1030** -0.5854** 0.0666**  -522.72 779  4 -536.04
 (0.1386)  (0.0286)  (0.1508)  (0.0229)     
8  -0.6786** 0.1343** -0.4027**  0.0574*  -525.78 782  4 -539.10
 (0.1431)  (0.0343)  (0.1556)  (0.0256)      
9  -1.1268** 0.1712** -0.7210** 0.0757**  -434.77 681  4 -447.82
  (0.1645) (0.0323) (0.1684) (0.0244)     
      
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% level.    35 
 
Table 6 




|Pt-1  - P*t-1| |Pw1(t)  - P*w1(1)|  {"t, Pt  - P*t} 
1  0.000** 0.036*  0.907  0.005** 
        
2  0.059 0.428  0.261  0.037* 
        
3  0.393 0.001**  0.656  0.018* 
        
4  0.458 0.802  0.426  0.000** 
        
5  0.000** 0.611  0.872  0.425 
        
6  0.171 0.237  0.949  0.000** 
        
7  0.632 0.576  0.522  0.067 
        
8  0.573 0.139  0.443  0.061 
        
9  0.057 0.474  0.833  0.001** 
        
 
Table reports p-value of test of null hypothesis that the indicated variable does not belong 
as an additional explanatory variable to an ACH model that already includes a constant 
and |Pt - Pt*|.  In columns (2)-(4), the ACH model includes nonzero # and $  Asterisk (*) 
denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.  Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically 
significant at the 1% level.    36 
 
Table 7 
Asymmetric ACH Estimates 
      
Firm  Pos const  Pos gap  Neg const Neg gap  #  $  log L  Obs Vars SBC 
1  2.9455** -0.1180** 2.5903** -0.0446** 0.1204  0.2669  -483.81  782  6  -503.79
  (0.4169) (0.0202) (0.3964) (0.0142) (0.0642) (0.3614)       
2  2.0009** -0.0580** 1.8077** -0.0002** 0.0180  0.8915**  -530.14  782  6  -550.12
  (0.4097) (0.0125) (0.4279) (0.0236) (0.0199) (0.0833)       
3  1.9611** -0.0651** 2.0082**  -0.0274*  -0.0678*  0.00  -524.47  782  5  -541.12
  (0.1099) (0.0113) (0.1234) (0.0131) (0.0332)  ----       
4  3.7869** -0.1609** 2.9703**  -0.0283  -0.0533** 0.3470  -404.71  641  6  -424.10
  (0.3465) (0.0205) (0.3212) (0.0238) (0.0195) (0.3908)       
5  1.5191** -0.0610** 1.3144** -0.0311** 0.1006*  0.7503**  -527.12  782  6  -547.11
  (0.3295) (0.0158) (0.2980) (0.0084) (0.0503) (0.1486)       
6  3.3324** -0.1870** 2.1597** -0.0344** 0.0194  0.7812**  -473.08  743  6  -492.92
  (0.4326) (0.0262) (0.3709) (0.0139) (0.0316) (0.2606)       
7  2.3710** -0.0721** 2.4904** -0.0496** 0.0122  0.7328  -522.94  779  6  -542.91
  (0.3086) (0.0133) (0.3042) (0.0126) (0.0301) (0.3833)       
8  3.0532** -0.0770** 2.7954**  -0.0328*  -0.0457  0.7863**  -528.06  782  6  -548.05
  (0.5259) (0.0113) (0.5082) (0.0142) (0.0360) (0.1839)       
9  2.9341** -0.1294** 2.4118** -0.0474** 0.1138  0.0037  -435.69  681  6  -455.27
  (0.3368) (0.0243) (0.2727) (0.0102) (0.0828) (0.1043)       
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  Double-asterisk (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 